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INTRODUCTION

Derrick Henry can run. Fast. The University of Alabama's former star running back amassed 3,591 rushing yards and 42 rushing
touchdowns throughout his college football career.' In the 20152016 season, he managed to break the legendary Herschel Walker's

* Matthew N. Korenoski graduated from Duquesne University School of Law, cum
laude, in June 2016. In December 2012, he graduated from the University of Pittsburgh,
cum laude, with a B.A. in English Writing and History with a Certificate in Public and Professional Writing. He would like to thank his supportive and loving family and girlfriend,
his extremely hard-working and keen-eyed Duquesne Law Review editors, and especially Professor Julia M. Glencer, his faculty advisor, mentor, and friend, who spent countless hours
editing this piece of writing, and without whom this article would not have been possible.
1.
See ESPN, Derrick Henry: Player Profile, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/college-football/player/ /id/546368/derrick-henry (last visited March 8, 2016).

493

Duquesne Law Review

494

Vol. 54

single season Southeastern Conference ("SEC") rushing record, 2
and he accomplished this feat while helping to lead the Alabama
Crimson Tide to the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") Playoffs as well as the National Championship Game,
where he ran for 158 yards and 3 touchdowns en route to Alabama
winning the National Title. 3 In doing so, he won the Heisman Memorial Trophy Award, an honor bestowed yearly on the most outstanding college football player. 4 Given that accomplishing these
feats of athleticism made Henry one of, if not the most, popular college football athlete of the 2015-2016 season, it was no surprise
that his name, image, and likeness were found plastered across various forms of media.
While a member of the Crimson Tide football team, Henry, like
thousands of other NCAA student-athletes, became a poster-childhis name, image, and likeness used by the University of Alabama
and the NCAA in numerous forms.5 During the time period in
which Henry was a member of the team, a quick trip around the
Internet revealed that his replica jersey (Number 2) was featured
for sale. 6 More notably, during major network television broadcasts
of Crimson Tide football games, audiences across the nation could
watch Henry blaze down the field, scoring touchdown after touchdown, on the way to win after win.7
Interestingly enough, Henry, like the rest of the NCAA's Football
Bowl Subdivision ("FBS") student-athletes, did not see a dime of the
revenue generated from the use of his name, image, and likeness
("NIL") by either the University of Alabama or the NCAA. Rather,
the NCAA has reaped tremendous financial reward by negotiating
for the rights in student-athletes' NILs, especially for big-name
2. See Sports Reference LLC, Southeastern Conference Single Season Leaders and Records for Rushing Yards, SPORTS-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.sports-reference.com/cfb/conferences/sec/leaders/rush-yds-player-season.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
3. See ESPN & Associated Press, Alabama Blanks Michigan State to Reach CFP Title
game,
ESPN.COM
(Jan.
1,
2015),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/re-

cap?gameld=400852732; ESPN, No. 2 Alabama Holds Off No. 1 Clemson for Nick Saban's
5th National Title,

ESPN.COM (Jan.

12,

2015),

http://espn.go.com/college-football/re-

cap?gameld=400852743.
4.

ESPN.com

McCaffrey

2nd,

News Services, Alabama's Derrick Henry Wins Heisman; Christian

ESPN.COM

(Dec.

13,

2015),

http://espn.go.com/college-foot-

ball/story/ /id/14346202/derrick-henry-alabama-crimson-tide-wins-heisman-trophy.
5. CBS Interactive, Derrick Henry, ROLLTIDE.COM, http://www.rolltide.com/sports/m-

footbl/mtt/derrick henry 844044.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
6. College Football Fan Shop, Derrick Henry - Alabama NCAA
COLLFOOTBALLFANSHOP.COM,

Jerseys,

http://www.collfanshop.com/shop-by-players/derrick-henry-

jersey.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015) (link now disabled, PDF of website on file with author).
7. See generally CBS Interactive, supra note 5 (outlining Henry's football statistics over
the years).
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players like Henry.8 And while these student-athletes do typically
receive increased scholarships as well as subsidized room and board
at school, the majority of these athletes will not go on to play sports
professionally; thus, the value of their NILs is at a premium and
will generate the most revenue during the time they play collegiately, where the talent pool is more diluted. 9 Thus, the NCAA's
framework is clearly flawed because its rules severely restrict a student-athlete's NIL rights. Recently, in O'Bannon v. NCAA ("O'Bannon I'),1o the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California levied a major blow against the NCAA in holding that
some of the NCAA's rules were an unreasonable restraint on trade,
thereby opening the door for more student-athletes across the nation to crusade against the NCAA's oppressive NIL regulations."
En route to analyzing the outcome of O'Bannon, this article first
discusses the history and background of the NCAA, its organization, and its comprehensive system of rules and regulations. 12 Next,
it provides a brief overview of the relevant Sherman Antitrust Act
sections, 13 followed by an examination of the pertinent case law covering certain antitrust lawsuits brought against the NCAA in recent decades. 14 Then, it explores the district court's O'Bannon decision. 15 Lastly, this article provides an analysis of O'Bannon's outcome and explains how the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit erred in its recent ruling ("O'Bannon II). In doing
so, this article ultimately concludes that certain NCAA rules do restrain trade, and that schools should be permitted to allow FBS
football and Division I men's basketball players to receive a certain
amount of compensation for use of their NILs in specific forms of
media. However, courts should still be cautious in ensuring that
schools are not permitted to give those student-athletes an excessive share of that compensation so as to totally demolish the
NCAA's amateurism concept.1 6

8. See Leslie E. Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O'Bannon Takes on
the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete's Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L.

REV. 1069, 1094 (2009-2010).
9. Edward H. Grimmett, NCAA Amateurism and Athletics: A Perfect Marriageor a Dysfunctional Relationship?-AnAntitrust Approach to Student-Athlete Compensation, 30 TOURO

L. REV.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

823, 853 (2014).
O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id.
See infra Section II-A, at 4.
See infra Section II-B, at 9.
See infra Section II-C, at 10; infra Section II-D, at 11.
See infra Section II-F, at 17.
See infra Section Il-A, at 4-6 (explaining how the NCAA has defined "amateurism"

over the years).
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THE NCAA AND THE HISTORY OF ITS AMATEURISM
PRINCIPLE

The NCAA: Origins of an Empire

Founded in 1906,17 the NCAA is a non-profit organization that
dedicates itself "to safeguarding the well-being of student-athletes
and equipping them with the skills to succeed on the playing field,
in the classroom and throughout life."18 Over 1,200 schools, confer-

ences, and affiliate organizations retain membership in the NCAA,
which offers its more than 460,000 student-athletes 19 the ability to
participate in 89 championship athletic events. 20 The NCAA is further subdivided into three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division III.21 Each one of these divisions creates its own rules in accordance with overarching NCAA principles, and the active school
then determines its classified division as long as it can meet the
applicable divisional criteria. 22
By far, Division I is the largest and most profitable of the divisions in that it boasts the biggest student bodies comprising nearly
350 colleges or universities, manages the largest athletics budgets
of approximately 6,000 teams, and offers the most generous amount
of scholarships to its more than 170,000 student-athletes. 2 3 To
qualify for Division I membership, a school must sponsor a minimum of 14 varsity sports teams and distribute a baseline amount
of financial aid to its student-athletes. 2 4
For football, Division I is further divided into two subdivisions:
the FBS and the Football Championship Subdivision ("FCS").25
FBS schools differ greatly from FCS schools in that FBS schools
may offer up to 85 full scholarships to players while FCS schools
are permitted to offer a smaller number of these scholarships to
their football teams' players. 26 Thus, the level of competition within
17.

Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2014),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-treadway/johnny-manziel-ncaa-eligibil-

ity b_3020985.html.
18.

NCAA, Who We Are, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are (last visited

Oct. 5, 2014).
19. Id.
20.

NCAA,

Membership, NCAA.ORG,

http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/member-

ship (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. NCAA, About the NCAA, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Oct. 5,
2014).
24. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963-64 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
25. Id. at 964.
26. Id.
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FBS, where about 120 schools currently compete, tends generally
to be higher than within FCS.2 7
Additionally, FBS and Division I are broken down even further
into different conferences, each of which is composed of eight to fifteen schools with their own eligibility requirements.2 8 Conferences
have the ability to organize conference-specific games, and while
they are considered members of the NCAA, they mostly operate independently by generating their own revenue and setting their own
rules, as long as they comply with existing NCAA policy. 2 9
An 18-member Board of Directors enacts the relevant rules governing the participation and competition within Division I.30
Within Division I, the NCAA states that it has a number of purposes. 31 The NCAA claims that one of its basic purposes is "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and,
by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." 32 This basic purpose is perhaps best epitomized in the NCAA's strong emphasis on the principle of amateurism. The NCAA states that its student-athletes shall
be amateurs within their respective sports, and that their primary
motivation should be education and the physical, mental, and social
benefits to be derived from that education, rather than for financial
gain, like endorsement deals, or for other reasons associated with
being a professional athlete. 33 The NCAA also calls students' participation in intercollegiate athletics an "avocation," and mandates
that student-athletes be protected from exploitation by professional
and commercial enterprises. 34
The NCAA's amateurism concept serves as the foundation for the
rules governing how its student-athletes may behave in certain situations. As such, if student-athletes commit any act that strips

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963-64 (stating that the Board is composed of various

university presidents and chancellors from 18 colleges or universities around the country).

31.

NCAA, 2014-2015 Division lManual, NCAA, Art. 1,

§

1.2, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2014), avail-

able at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/Dll5.pdf.

32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 4, §2.9.

34. Id. "Avocation" is defined as "an activity that you do regularly for enjoyment rather
than as a job." Avocation Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/avocation (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).

498

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 54

them of their "amateur" status, they become ineligible for intercollegiate athletic competition in their particular sport. 35 Most notably, student-athletes lose amateur status when they "[u]se[] [their]
athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that
sport ... ."3 6 Moreover, the NCAA defines numerous activities that

constitute "prohibited forms of pay." Most notably, the definition
includes: (1) salary, (2) gratuity or compensation, (3) education expenses not permitted by the NCAA's governing legislation, (4) cash
as an award for participating in athletic competition, (5) payment
based on performance, and (6) preferential treatment, services, or
benefits based on the student-athlete's skill or reputation. 37 The
NCAA also bars student-athletes from endorsing any commercial
product or service while they are in school, regardless of whether
they receive compensation to do so. 3 8 Thus, while student-athletes
may generally earn money from any "on- or off-campus employment" unrelated to athletic ability, they may not receive "any remuneration for value or utility that the student-athlete may have for
the employer because of the publicity, reputation, fame or personal
following that he or she has obtained because of athletics ability." 39
Most relevantly, NCAA rules also prohibit schools from offering
current student-athletes any compensation from their schools or
outside sources for the use of their NILs in live game telecasts, videogames, game re-broadcasts, advertisements, and other footage. 40
These rules currently affect FBS football and Division I men's basketball, two of the most popular NCAA sports. These rules in particular also impose one strict limitation on the amount of overall
compensation schools may distribute to their student-athletes. 4 1
The NCAA imposes this limitation in the form of a cap on the
total amount of financial aid that a school may distribute to student-athletes by prohibiting student-athletes from receiving financial aid over the "cost of attendance." 42 The bylaws define "cost of
attendance" as "an amount calculated by [a school]'s financial aid
35.

NCAA, supra note 31, at §12.1.2, at 59.

36. Id. (stating that examples of acts that strip student-athletes of their amateur status
include: accepting a promise of pay even after termination of intercollegiate athletics competition, signing a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional sports, and/or entering into an agreement with an agent).

37. Id. at 59-61.
38. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Grimmett, supra
note 9, at 856 ("The thought of corporate advertisers dealing directly with student-athletes"
could pose a threat to the NCAA's amateurism concept.).

39.
40.
41.
42.

O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
Id. at 971.
Id.
Id.
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office, using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation,
and other expenses related to attendance" at that school. 43 The cost
of attendance has generally been higher than the value of a full
grant-in-aid, and although the gap between the full grant-in-aid
and the cost of attendance varies from school to school, it is typically
a few thousand dollars. 4 4
Additionally, the NCAA used to prohibit any student-athlete
from receiving "financial aid based on athletic[] ability" that exceeded the value of a full "grant-in-aid." 45 The bylaws define full
"grant-in-aid" as "financial aid that consists of tuition and fees,
room and board, and required course-related books," an amount
that varies yearly from school to school. 46 If a student-athlete received financial aid over this amount, he used to have to forfeit his
athletic eligibility. 47 However, in August 2014, the NCAA announced it would allow athletic conferences to authorize their member schools to increase scholarships up to the full cost of attendance. 48

Given the NCAA's strict limitations within its eligibility rules,
including the NIL revenue restrictions, over the past decade or so,
various student-athletes have clamored for change. 49 They have argued that the NCAA's rules are illegal as a matter of antitrust law,
in that the NCAA imposes unreasonable restraints on trade.50 As
such, a robust body of case law now exists, documenting these student-athlete-plaintiffs'5 1 attempts to achieve a more equitable intercollegiate athletics atmosphere via the Sherman Antitrust Act.
B.

The Sherman Antitrust Act

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act") mandates that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the

43. Id.
44. Id. at 971-72.
45. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 971-72.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2015).
49. See infra Section II-C, Section II-D, and Section II-E.
50. Id. See, e.g., NCAAv. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); Agnew
v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
51.

I generally refer here to "student-athlete plaintiffs" over the years, but this reference

also includes the Plaintiffs in the O'Bannon suit. Additionally, while the O'Bannon Plaintiffs
were actually Appellees on appeal, I have opted to call them "Plaintiffs" for purposes of this
article.
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several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 52

To prevail on a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
must show "(1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under
either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and (3)
that the restraint affected interstate commerce." 53
In determining whether an agreement restrains trade (the second element of the test), courts use either the rule of reason or per
se analysis. 54 In the Ninth Circuit, the court presumptively uses
the rule of reason as the default standard, rather than the "quick
look" or per se analysis.5 5 Additionally, concerted actions undertaken by joint ventures, like the NCAA, are analyzed under the
more flexible rule of reason.5 6 Under the rule of reason analysis,
the Ninth Circuit utilizes a burden-shifting framework in which the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing the restraint produces
"significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market."5 7 If
the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must then attempt to
prove the restraint's procompetitive benefits.5 8 Lastly, if the
defendant produces sufficient evidence of procompetitive benefits,
the plaintiff must "show that any legitimate objectives can be
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner." 59
C.

Early Years of Amateurism: Pre-Boardof Regents

As early as the 1970s, student-athletes began attacking the
NCAA via various lawsuits under the Sherman Act.60 In Jones v.
NCAA, 61 the plaintiff, a Northeastern University hockey player, alleged that the NCAA's eligibility rules, which prevented him from
participating in intercollegiate hockey because he had received compensation for playing on other hockey teams before college, constituted an antitrust violation. 62 In holding that the plaintiff could not
52. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2004).
53. Tanaka u. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hairston v.
Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original).
54. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062.
55. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Cal. ex rel. Harris
v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S.
1, 5 (2006)).
56. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985 (citing Am. Needle, Inc. u. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203
(2010) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101, 104 (1984)).
57. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063 (citing Hairston, 101 F. 3d at 1319).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 297-98.
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succeed on his antitrust claim, the district court stated that "[t]he
N.C.A.A. [eligibility rules were not designed to coerce students into
staying away from intercollegiate athletics, but to implement the
N.C.A.A. basic principles of amateurism, principles which have
been at the heart of the Association since its founding." 63 The court
also stated that any limitation on college sports was merely an "incidental result" of the NCAA's pursuit of its "legitimate goals." 64
Another antitrust suit arose in Justice v. NCAA, 65 where the
NCAA imposed sanctions on the University of Arizona for numerous occasions when university staff members and officials provided
compensation or other benefits to members of the school's football
team, or individuals being recruited by the school's football program. 66 The plaintiffs alleged "that the sanctions by an association
of colleges and universities in competition with the University of
Arizona constitute[d] a group boycott[J" thus, violating Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 6 7 In ruling that the NCAA's sanctions were not
an antitrust violation, the court reasoned that those rules were "rationally related to the NCAA's stated objective of promoting amateurism." 68

D.

Board of Regents: The First Major Antitrust Attack

While Jones and Justice provided brief glimpses into student-athletes' antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA, the first large-scale antitrust attack against the NCAA did not come until 1984. In NCAA
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,69 the University
of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia together challenged one
of the NCAA's programs that limited the total number of televised
intercollegiate football games. 70 The larger universities, mainly
schools with successful football programs, had begun to realize that
instead of using the NCAA to broker deals with major television
networks, the universities could instead receive a better deal if they
dealt directly with the television networks.7 1 The NCAA then

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
at

643/.

Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304.
Id.
Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 371.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id.
Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011), available
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308
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threatened sanctions against the schools, prompting the suit.72 The
suit eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, and the
Court held that the NCAA's rules constituted horizontal price fixing
with output limitations; thus, the plan constituted a restraint on
operation of the free market of college football. 73 Moreover, because
restraints were not justified on the basis of the procompetitive effects of protecting live attendance or maintaining competitive balance among amateur athletic teams, the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower courts' decisions in ruling that the NCAA's rules had significant anticompetitive effects, thereby violating the Sherman
Act. 74

While the Court did not directly address the issue of the NCAA
using student-athletes' NILs without compensating those studentathletes, it did comment on the topic in dicta by "express[ing] the
importance of the NCAA's task as a regulatory body to preserve the
amateur and academic status of student-athletes, as well as maintain competitive balance among member institutions."7 5 In reinforcing the above statement as the NCAA's objective on behalf of its
student-athletes, the Court also stated that, "[i]n order to preserve
the character and quality of the [NCAA's] 'product,' athletes must
not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like." 76 Thus,
because the Court assumed that "most of the regulatory controls of
the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition," moving
forward from Board of Regents, other courts have looked to whether
the NCAA regulation at issue has an effect on amateurism or fair
competition when analyzing the legality of NCAA restraints on
competition.77
E.

Board of Regents'Progeny

Following Board of Regents, a number of courts have offered some
worthwhile commentary on the NIL compensation issue, and an

72.
73.

Id.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 86.

74.

Grimmett, supra note 9, at 829; see also Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 (reasoning

that "by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate

athletics in the Nation's life.").
75. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 832.
76. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added).
77. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 833.
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analysis of these decisions reveals that the NCAA has been the target of antitrust litigation for years.78 For instance, in 1988, in
McCormack v. NCAA, 79 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a group of Southern Methodist University
alumni, football players, and cheerleaders had failed to state a
claim when they sued the NCAA on an antitrust basis, alleging that
the NCAA's rules unreasonably restricted compensation in the form
of scholarships to student-athletes.8 0 In rejecting the plaintiffs'
claims, the court noted that the rules determining eligibility for college football games "enhance public interest in [those games]" and
are thus, procompetitive. 81 Additionally, the court emphasized the
dividing line between college sports and professional sports in stating that "[t]he NCAA markets college football as a product distinct
from professional football[,]" 82 and that the NCAA's "eligibility rules
create the product and allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures." 83
In 1992, in Banks v. NCAA, 84 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit rejected a University of Notre Dame football
player's argument that the NCAA's "no-draft" rule and "no-agent"
rule8 5 were anticompetitive restraints on trade. 86 In reaching its
conclusion, the court reasoned that these rules were actually procompetitive in that "the NCAA does not exist as a minor league
training ground for future NFL players but rather to provide an
opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a
collegiate education."8 7 The court elaborated on this position in
stressing that the two rules at issue helped to maintain separation

78. See generally Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. NCAA, 139
F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA,
845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
79. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 1345.
81. Id. at 1344 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1345.
84. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 1083-1084 (stating that the NCAA's "no-draft" rule (Rule 12.2.4.2) maintains
.

that "[a]n individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the individual asks to
be placed on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a professional league in that sport .

. ." and that the NCAA's "no-agent" rule (Rule 12.3.1) maintains that "[a]n individual shall
be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed ... to be
represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputa-

tion in that sport").
86. Id. at 1098.
87. Id. at 1089-1090.
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between the commercial world of professional sports and the higher
education-based world of intercollegiate athletics.8 8
In 1998, in Smith v. NCAA, 89 a college volleyball player filed an
antitrust lawsuit in relation to NCAA rules concerning her final two
years of athletic eligibility when she enrolled at a post-graduate
program different from her undergraduate university. 90 Stressing
the importance of amateurism's effect on fair competition, the Third
Circuit ruled that the NCAA's regulation was procompetitive in
that it prohibited post-graduate recruiting so that student-athletes
would not forgo eligibility at the undergraduate level to preserve
athletic eligibility at the post-baccalaureate level. 9 1
That same year, in Law v. NCAA, 92 the Tenth Circuit held that
an NCAA regulation restricting Division-I college coaches' salaries
was an unlawful restraint of trade. 93 The NCAA had begun to fix
these coaches' salaries at a certain amount because larger schools
were paying more experienced coaches more money, which the
smaller schools could not afford. 94 The court found that the NCAA
member schools' agreement to restrict coaches' salaries constituted
a "horizontal price fixing agreement because the agreement eliminated market competition for assistant football coaches." 95 In addition to ruling that the NCAA had not proffered a sufficient procompetitive justification, the court stated in a footnote that the NCAA
could not argue that the challenged regulation fostered amateurism; rather, it could only use that argument in relation to preserving the amateur status of its student-athletes, not the schools'
coaches. 96
Most recently, in 2012, in Agnew v. NCAA, 97 the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of an action filed by student-athletes against
the NCAA under the Sherman Act, alleging that NCAA regulations
capping the scholarships per team, and prohibiting multi-year

88.

Id. at 1091; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 746 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (stat-

ing that "the 'no-agent' and 'no-draft' [r]ules have primarily procompetitive effects in that

they promote the integrity and quality of college football and preserve the distinct 'product'
of major college football as an amateur sport") (emphasis added).

89.
90.

139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
Id.

91. Id. at 187 (stating that "the bylaw at issue here is a reasonable restraint which furthers the NCAA's goal of fair competition and the survival of intercollegiate athletics and is
thus procompetitive").

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1024.
Id. at 1013.
Grimmett, supra note 9, at 843.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1022, n.14.
683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
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scholarships, had an anticompetitive effect on the market for student-athletes. 9 8 However, in doing so, the court used some instructive language for courts analyzing the NCAA's amateurism principle in the context of antitrust lawsuits. The court stated that when
the NCAA's bylaws are challenged, the first-and perhaps onlyquestion to ask is "whether the NCAA regulations at issue are of
the type that have been blessed by the Supreme Court [in Board of
Regents], making them presumptively procompetitive." 99 The court
also emphasized that the eligibility rules are "clearly necessary to
preserve amateurism and the student-athlete in college football.
Indeed, they define what it means to be an amateur or a studentathlete, and are therefore essential to the very existence of the product of college football."10 0 However, the court also stated that "if a
regulation is not, on its face, helping to 'preserve a tradition that
might otherwise die,' either a more searching Rule of Reason analysis ... or a quick look at the rule will obviously illustrate its anticompetitiveness."1 0 1
In 2013, and relating most relevantly to O'Bannon, in In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation (hereinafter
"In re NIL Litigation"),10 2 Electronic Arts ("EA"), a prominent video
game developer, settled with the O'Bannon Plaintiffs over the burgeoning issue of commercial entities using student athletes' NILs
without compensating them, going so far as to refrain from producing its popular "NCAA College Football" video game series. 103 EA
had previously developed its annual "NCAA College Football" game
for over a decade, allowing video game players to choose from numerous college football teams to use while playing against a virtual
version of another team. 104 While EA did not use current or former
college football players' names in the game, it did use their likenesses, attempting to model each virtual player after what he
looked like in real life.10 5 EA's "NCAA College Football" series was
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 341; see also id. at 342-43 (stating that "when an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant

to help maintain the 'revered tradition of amateurism in college sports' or the 'preservation
of the student-athlete in higher education,' the bylaw will be presumed procompetitive, since

we must give the NCAA 'ample latitude to play that role') (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).
100. Id. at 343.
101. Id.
102. 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. dismissed sub nom. Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135
S. Ct. 42 (2014).
103. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 831.
104. Gamespot,
Bill
Walsh
College
Football,
GAMESPOT.COM,
http://www.gamespot.com/bill-walsh-college-football/reviews/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2015)
(showing that as early as 1993, video game developers were using student-athletes' NILs).

105.

Grimmett, supra note 9, at 853.

506

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 54

extremely popular, but given the combination of three major FBS
conferences disallowing EA to use its football players' NILs in the
video game, and the pendency of the lawsuit where Plaintiffs
claimed that the characteristics of the in-game players "essentially
mirrored those of actual college athletes," EA determined that its
best move was to discontinue making the game, at least for the time
being. 106
F.

O'Bannon v. NCAA: Rewriting the Script

While the gears of change churned slowly in the aftermath of
Board of Regents, a recent decision resulted in a major uprooting of
the NCAA's grasp on the college athletics landscape. In particular,
the rules system governing the payment of student-athletes for the
NCAA's use of their NILs is a hotly debated issue nationwide, especially given the tremendous depth and breadth of the NCAA. The
issue came to a head in O'Bannon L107
Plaintiffs in the case are Ed O'Bannon, a former Division I basketball star at UCLA, and 19 other current or former student-athletes who play or played FBS football or Division I men's basketball
between 1956 and the present.1 08 Plaintiffs brought an antitrust
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against the NCAA, EA, 109 and Collegiate Licensing Company ("CLC"), a trademark licensing and
marketing company providing its services to numerous colleges and
universities.1 1 0 Plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA bylaws violated
the Sherman Act by unreasonably restraining trade in precluding
schools from allowing student-athletes to receive a share of revenue
that the NCAA and its member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the student athletes' NILs in various forms of media.1 11 Prior to the O'Bannon decision, Plaintiffs reached a settlement with EA and CLC. 112

106. Steve Eder, E.A. Sports Settles Lawsuit With College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/sports/ncaafootball/ea-sports-wontmake-college-video-game-in-2014.html?_r=1&.
107. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
108. Id. at 965.
109. This Defendant (EA) is the same as in the previously mentioned litigation against
EA.
110. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 965.
111. Id. at 963.
112. Id. at 965; see also In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that "video game developer's use of the likenesses of
college athletes in its video games was not protected by the First Amendment and therefore
former college football player's right-of-publicity claims against developer were not barred by
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In regard to the three elements necessary to succeed upon an antitrust claim, neither party disputed the presence of the first and
third elements. 113 Thus, the only issue for the district court was
whether the challenged NCAA rules unreasonably restrained
trade. 1 14 Regarding the second element, the district court explained
that precedent in the Ninth Circuit maintained that "[a] restraint
violates the rule of reason if the restraint's harm to competition
outweighs its procompetitive effects" based on a burden-shifting
framework.11 5 In applying this framework, the O'Bannon district
court first evaluated whether the restraint caused anticompetitive
effects in Plaintiffs' two challenged markets: the "college education
market" and the "group licensing market."1 16
The district court addressed the "college education market" first
and found that there was a "national market in which NCAA Division I schools compete to sell unique bundles of goods and services
to elite football and basketball recruits."1 1 7 Because other divisions
and professional leagues differed greatly both in price and quality,
the district court found that there were no acceptable substitutes
for FBS football and Division I basketball. 118 Thus, because no
other non-Division I or professional leagues could deprive schools'
FBS football or Division I basketball teams from a significant number of recruits, they were not suppliers in the market identified by
Plaintiffs. 119

California's anti-SLAPP statute"), cert. dismissed sub nom. Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135 S.
Ct. 42 (2014).
113. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985. As a reminder, the first element required a "contract,
combination, or conspiracy"; the second required that the agreement unreasonably restrain
trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and the third element
required that the restraint affect interstate commerce. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062 (citing
Hairston u. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d at 1318).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 985 (quoting Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063).
116. Id. at 986 (stating that the "college education market" describes a market in which
colleges and universities compete to recruit student-athletes to play FBS football or Division
I basketball, and the "group licensing market" describes a market in which videogame developers, television networks, and others compete for group licenses to use the NILs of FBS
football and Division I men's basketball players in videogames, telecasts, and clips).
117. Id.; see also Michael Carrier, U.S. Court Finds That an Athletics Ass'n's Rules Restricting Payments to Student-Athletes Violate Antitrust Laws (O'Bannon u. NCAA), RUTGERS
UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW-CAMDEN, (e-Competitions Bulletin, No. 68725) Sept. 2014, at 1-2.
118. Carrier, supra note 117, at 2. For example, non-Division I schools typically offer a
lower level of athletic competition, inferior training facilities, and fewer opportunities to play
in front of the largest crowds and television audiences. On the other end of the spectrum,
professional sports leagues do not offer student-athletes the opportunity to earn an education. Id.
119. Id.
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Second, the district court addressed Plaintiffs' alleged "group licensing market." 120 Plaintiffs argued that three submarkets covering group licenses for student-athletes' NILs existed in (1) livegame telecasts, (2) video games, and (3) game rebroadcasts, highlight clips, and other archival footage. 12 1 In short, the district court
deduced that each of these submarkets did exist; however, Plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate any recognizable harm in any of
them.122

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs were still able to demonstrate harm that
restrained trade in the "college education market." 123 The O'Bannon district court found that "[b]ecause FBS football and Division I
..
schools [were] the only suppliers [of their product] in the relevant market, they [had] the power . . . to fix the price of their product" via the NCAA and its conference. 124 Essentially, the schools
formed an agreement to charge every recruit the same price for the
bundle of educational and athletic services: "to wit, the recruit's
athletic services along with [his NIL] while he is in school." 12 5 The
district court decided that the NCAA rules enabling schools to do
the above price fixing constituted a restraint on trade, and in the
absence of this agreement, schools would offer these student-athletes more compensation for their NILS, i.e., greater than zero dollars as the NCAA had mandated. 126
Having found a restraint, the district court moved to the second
step in the burden-shifting framework by placing the burden on the
NCAA to show procompetitive effects of the restraint. 127 The NCAA
then proffered four procompetitive effects of the restraint: (1) preserving the NCAA's tradition of amateurism; (2) maintaining competitive balance among FBS football and Division I men's basketball teams; (3) promoting the integration of academics and athletics; and (4) increasing the total output of its product.128
In assessing these "procompetitive effects," the district court rejected the NCAA's second and fourth justifications, 129 but gave more
120.
121.
122.

O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 993.
Id.
Id. at 993-98 (stating that the challenged rules do not hinder competition among any

potential buyers or sellers of group licenses).

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 991.
Id.
Id. at 988.
O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 998-99 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id. at 999.
Id.

129. Id. at 999-1004; see also Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forwardfor College Athlete

Rights, and a Gateway for Far GranderChange, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2332 (2014);
Carrier, supra note 117, at 3-5.
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weight to the NCAA's first and third justifications. First, the district court addressed the NCAA's amateurism argument and stated
that while "the NCAA's restrictions . .. play a limited role in driving
consumer demand for FBS football and Division I basketball-related products," and while they may justify large payments to these
student-athletes during school, "[the restrictions] do not justify the
rigid prohibition on compensating student-athletes .

.

. with any

share of licensing revenue generated from the use of their
[NILs]." 130 Second, the district court addressed the NCAA's argument that promoting the integration of academics and athletics "improve[s] the quality of educational services provided to student-athletes in the restrained college education market." 131 The district
court explained that the goal of improving product quality has been
recognized as a procompetitive effect, 132 and then found that integrating student-athletes into their schools' academic communities
does improve the quality of the educational services student-athletes receive. 133 However, while the district court agreed that limited restriction in this regard did further the procompetitive benefit,
it stated that the restraint's sweeping reach was still not justified;
thus, the district court accorded this third argument limited
weight. 134 Consequently, because the NCAA had identified two procompetitive benefits of the rules restraining NIL compensation to
student-athletes, the Plaintiffs were next obligated to show less restrictive alternatives of accomplishing those procompetitive
goals.135
Plaintiffs offered three less restrictive alternatives: (1) raise the
grant-in-aid limit to allow schools to award stipends, derived from
specified sources of licensing revenue, to student-athletes; (2) allow
schools to deposit a share of licensing revenue into a trust fund for
student-athletes, payable after the student-athletes graduate or
leave school for other reasons; and/or (3) permit student-athletes to
receive limited compensation for third-party endorsements approved by their schools. 136 In evaluating the Plaintiffs' proffered
less restrictive alternatives, the district court noted that antitrust

130.
131.
132.

O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.
Id. at 1003.
Id.; see also Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1157, 1159-60

(9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the product here was a physician performing caesarian sec-

tions only after becoming certified); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019-21 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the product here was college basketball coaching).

133.
134.
135.
136.

O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1003.
Id.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 982, 1005.
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plaintiffs generally must show that "an alternative is substantially
less restrictive and is virtually as effective in serving the legitimate
objective without significantly increased cost." 13 7 In applying this
standard, the district court accepted the first two alternatives, i.e.,
that the NCAA could award stipends to student-athletes up to the
full cost of attendance to make up for any shortfall in its grant-inaid, and that the NCAA could deposit NIL licensing revenue into a
narrowly-tailored trust payment system to be distributed to student-athletes after they leave college or their eligibility expires. 138
In formulating its overall holding, the district court ruled that
the NCAA's restrictions unreasonably restrained trade by preventing FBS football players and Division I men's basketball players
from sharing in at least some of the revenue generated by use of
their NILs. 139 As a remedy, the district court then instituted an
injunction accomplishing two goals: (1) that the overall compensation from the school that the student-athlete may receive shall not
be capped below the cost of attendance; 140 and (2) that the revenue
from NIL licensing of each individual student-athlete could be deposited in a deferred trust at no more than $5,000 for every year the
student-athlete remains academically eligible. 141 The student-athletes would only receive this compensation when they lost their eli-

137.
138.

Id. at 1004-05 (citing Tuolumne, 236 F.3d at 1159) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1005; see also id. at 1006, n.16 (stating that over the past two decades, various

commentators have suggested that "the NCAA could hold payments in trust for its studentathletes without violating generally accepted understandings of amateurism used by other
sports organizations") (citing Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, "4.J. Morrison"and His Right of

Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 294 (2008)); Kristine
Mueller, No Control Over Their Rights of Publicity: College Athletes Left Sitting the Bench, 2

DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 87-88 (2004); Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts Off
Their Backs: Colleges GettingAway with Violating the Right ofPublicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM.

& ENT. L. J. 133, 155 (1996); Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participationin IntercollegiateAthletics, 3 SPORTS L. J. 25, 44-45
(1996); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and Compen-

sation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 25, 27 (1991)).
139. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955.
140. Id. at 1007-08. The NCAA noted in its brief filed in the Ninth Circuit in the O'Bannon
case that "[o]n August 7, 2014, the NCAA allowed conferences to permit their schools to
increase the maximum grant-in-aid up to the cost of attendance." Brief for Appellant at 10,

n.1, O'Bannon v. NCAA, Docket No. 14-17068 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, the main less restrictive
alternative at issue here, since conferences are permitted to allow their schools to increase
the grant-in-aid up to the cost of attendance, is the deferred trust system; however, without
any court action, the NCAA could still rescind that rule.

141.

O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-08. The court arrived at the $5,000 figure in part by

relying on the NCAA's witnesses who stated that their concerns about student-athlete compensation would be lessened or negated if that compensation was capped at a few thousand
dollars per year. Id. The NCAA also stated that that the amount was comparable to the
amount the NCAA permits student-athletes to receive if they qualify for Pell grants, and the
amount that NCAA tennis players may receive prior to enrollment. Id.
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gibility-by using up their four years of athletic eligibility or by declaring themselves professionals and leaving school early. 142 The
injunction did not obligate schools to pay out this compensation but
rather permitted them to do so. 1 4 3 Schools themselves could also
offer lesser amounts of deferred compensation if they chose, but the
district court ruled they could not unlawfully conspire with each
other in setting those amounts. 14 4
This decision provides commentary on the larger, more general
issue of whether certain student-athletes should be "paid" per se,
even more so now that the Ninth Circuit has ruled on the matter.
As such, the district court's decision was a major victory, not only
for the Plaintiffs in the case, but also for student-athletes who see
no financial gain from their school's use of their NILs due to the
NCAA's overly restrictive rules.
G.

Other Attacks on Amateurism

In addition to the O'Bannon litigation, two other cases currently
focus on the issues of amateurism and student-athletes receiving
compensation while in college. First, in Jenkins v. NCAA, 145 the
plaintiffs, four FBS football and Division I men's basketball players,
have sued the NCAA in the United States District Court for the
District of California alleging an antitrust violation; they claim that
the NCAA operates as a cartel that uses an illegal price-fixing
agreement to unreasonably restrain trade without a legitimate procompetitive justification. 14 6 The complaint states that the NCAA
"[has] lost [its] way far down the road of commercialism, signing
multi-billion dollar contracts wholly disconnected from the
interests of 'student athletes,' who are barred from receiving the
benefits of competitive markets for their services even though their
services generate these massive revenues."147 The plaintiffs in Jenkins are not seeking damages but rather an injunction to "open up
athlete compensation to market forces, and basically blow up the
NCAA as currently constructed." 1 4 8 While the Jenkins lawsuit is

142. Id. at 1008.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 4:2014cv02758 (N.D. Cal. filed June 18, 2014).
146. Complaint and Jury Demand at 1-2, Jenkins v. NCAA, D. N.J., Civil Action No. 14CV-01678, filed 03/17/14 (on file with author).
147. Id. at 2.
148. Sam Brodey, The Latest Court Case Didn't End the NCAA As We Know It. The Next
One Might, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/mixed-media/2014/08/obannon-jenkins-ncaa-college-athletes-paid.
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the "broadest and boldest challenge to the NCAA's amateurism system yet," and the case may not be resolved for quite some time, it
represents another potential threat to the NCAA's rules restricting
student-athletes' rights to compensation for use of their NILs. 14 9
Second, while not involving an antitrust matter, in a National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") decision rendered on March 26,
2014, between Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association ("CAPA"), the Regional Director of the NLRB ruled
that student-athletes on the school's football team had adequately
alleged certain violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 50 In
doing so, the NLRB found that football players who are receiving
scholarships to perform football-related services for the employer
under a contract for hire in return for compensation are subject to
the employer's control and are, consequently, employees. 15 1 In making this ruling, the NLRB also stated that, given the football players' intense commitment to their sport and to their head coach's demands, they were not "primarily students," and that the football
players "worked" more hours per week during an academic year
than some "undisputed full-time employees work at their jobs." 1 5 2

Northwestern University appealed the decision, and the NLRB
"exercised its discretion not to assert jurisdiction and dismissed the
representation petition filed by the union." 15 3 In the decision, the

Board held "that asserting jurisdiction would not promote labor stability due to the nature and structure of NCAA Division I [FBS]."154

149.

Id.

150.

See generally Northwestern Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, Case 13-RC-

121359, NLRB (Mar. 26, 2014).
151. Id. at 14. The NLRB specifically found that football players receiving grant-in-aid
performed valuable services for Northwestern, in that the football program generated nearly

$235 million from 2003-2012. Id. Additionally, the compensation the players receive comes
in the form of scholarships they bargain for upon signing a "tender," which serves as an employment contract and gives players detailed information concerning the duration and conditions under which the compensation will be provided to them. Id. Moreover, the players'
scholarships can be reduced or canceled by the Head Coach for a number of reasons, clearly
indicating that the players receive these scholarships in exchange for services performed. Id.
at 15. The NLRB also found that Northwestern University exhibits significant control over
these football players in that the players are required to attend numerous hours of practice
a week, miss certain classes to participate in a game, and abide by other myriad restrictions.

See generally id. at 15-17.
152. Id. at 18 (stating that football players spend 40-50 hours on football duties per week
during the three to four-month football season).
153. NLRB, Board Unanimously Decides to Decline Jurisdiction in Northwestern Case,
NLRB.GOV (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-unanimously-decides-decline-jurisdiction-northwestern-case (stating that "[b]y statute the Board
does not have jurisdiction over state-run colleges and universities, which constitute 108 of

the roughly 125 FBS teams").
154. Id.
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While this decision did not work in the favor of Northwestern's student-athletes, the NLRB itself stated that "[t]his decision is narrowly focused to apply only to the players in this case and does not
preclude reconsideration of this issue in the future."1 5 5 Thus, by
taking a relatively easy way out by declining jurisdiction, the NLRB
did not truly analyze the players' arguments; if the NLRB does so
in the future, in consideration of the changing attitudes towards
student-athlete compensation, perhaps the NLRB will give the
players' arguments more thought. Both Jenkins and the NLRB decision provide powerful insight into student-athlete NIL compensation issues resulting from the O'Bannon decision in the Ninth Circuit, a decision that, despite its outcome, could affect the lives of
numerous student-athletes for years to come.
III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ROLE IN THE DOWNFALL OF
AMATEURISM

Following the district court's decision issued on August 8, 2014,
the NCAA promptly appealed. The key issue on appeal was
whether the importance of the NCAA's amateurism concept served
as a procompetitive justification of the NCAA's rules restricting
compensation to student-athletes for use of their NILs, such that
the district court overstepped its boundaries in formulating its less
restrictive alternatives.1 5 6 Essentially, the NCAA argued on appeal
that Board of Regents still very much stands for the proposition that
courts should defer to the amateurism principle as a vital ingredient in the NCAA's recipe for FBS and Division I men's basketball. 15 7
On the contrary, Plaintiffs argued that over the years, the forces of
commercialism have gradually whittled away at the amateurism
principle, making it entitled to less weight as a procompetitive justification, and consequently tipping the scales in Plaintiffs' favor.1 58
Plaintiffs rightly diagnosed that the NCAA's amateurism principle
no longer functions as it used to, because highly commercialized
pressures have greatly diminished it.
A.

Defusing the NCAA's Amateurism Defense

On September 30, 2015, the Ninth Circuit resolved the appeal by
laying down its opinion. 159 By and large, the Ninth Circuit agreed
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2015).
See infra Section III-A and Section III-B.
See id.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049.
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with much of the district court's opinion. Before delving into the
rule of reason, the Ninth Circuit dismissed three of the NCAA's primary arguments.1 60
In arguing for placing a restriction on NIL compensation to FBS
football and Division I men's basketball players, the NCAA again
stressed the procompetitive justifications offered in O'Bannon,
while highlighting, in particular, the amateurism principle.16 1
More specifically, the NCAA made four main arguments: (1) the
NCAA's amateurism rules define collegiate sports as a unique product and are, therefore, valid as a matter of law; (2) the challenged
NCAA rules are not covered by the Sherman Act because they do
not regulate "commercial" activity; (3) Plaintiffs lack antitrust injury; and (4) the challenged NCAA rules are valid under a rule of
reason analysis. 162
The NCAA's strongest weapon on appeal appeared to be that the
Supreme Court in Board of Regents heavily stressed the importance
of the NCAA's regulations in preserving amateurism and fostering
competition. 163 While Board of Regents was not the first decision to
uphold the NCAA's amateurism defense as a valid procompetitive
justification of the NCAA's rules, 164 it had the farthest-reaching effect, as other courts have used the Supreme Court's dicta as the
basis for upholding amateurism as procompetitive. The NCAA contended on appeal that its rules designed to protect the amateur status of student-athletes are valid under the Sherman Act as a matter

160.
161.

Id. at 1053, 1061, 1064-67.
Id. at 1072; O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The NCAA

argued before the district court that the restrictions are necessary to: (1) preserve its tradition of amateurism; (2) maintain competitive balance among FBS football and Division I
men's basketball teams; (3) promote the integration of academics and athletics; and 4) in-

crease the total output of its product. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
162. Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at ii-iii.
163. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 832-833; see also id. at 836 (stating that "[c]ourts have
consistently viewed the NCAA's regulatory powers as an axe against antitrust scrutiny, with
the foundation established in Board of Regents acting as the handle"); Brief for Appellant,

supra note 140, at 23-24.
164. See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (upholding NCAA-imposed
sanctions on the University of Arizona for numerous occasions where university staff members and officials provided compensation or other benefits to members of the schools' football
team or individuals being recruited by the school's football team); see also id. at 371 (stating
that rules providing for sanctions when universities compensate certain student-athletes for
participation in intercollegiate athletics were "rationally related to the NCAA's stated objec-

tive of promoting amateurism"); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975) (stating that "[t]he N.C.A.A. eligibility rules were not designed to coerce students into staying
away from intercollegiate athletics, but to implement the N.C.A.A. basic principles of amateurism, principles which have been at the heart of the Association since its founding," and
also stating any limitation on college sports was merely an "incidental result" of the NCAA's

pursuit of its "legitimate goals").
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of law, 165 and that Board of Regents mandated that "most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA" are assumed to be "justifiable
means of fostering competition . . . ."166 Thus, the NCAA stressed
in its brief that there was a presumption that NCAA eligibility rules
preserving amateurism were valid and procompetitive as a matter
of antitrust law under the Sherman Act. 167
While the NCAA argued that substantial deference must be given
to the Supreme Court's stance on amateurism, the immense growth
and profitability of the NCAA over the past 30 years since Board of
Regents was decided means that preserving the line between amateurism and professionalism is now more difficult, lessening this
procompetitive justification greatly, and allowing for a less restrictive alternative that facilitates, rather than restricts, trade. 168 Also,
interpreting mere dicta to serve as the standard upon which all current and future NCAA NIL cases are to be determined runs contrary to the gigantic scope of the NCAA's rules. 169 Rather, "[b]y using the word 'can' rather than 'must,'. . . it is clear that the Supreme
Court . . . never actually reached any legal conclusion in favor of
specially preserving NCAA amateurism."17 0 Thus, one must be
careful not to fall into the trap of adopting the view the NCAA urged
there.
Overall, the NCAA's reliance on Board of Regents was greatly
tested given that the decision was rendered over 30 years ago. The
crux of the O'Bannoncase was unique in that one of the key debates
focused around a principle (amateurism) that is not fixed in time.
Rather, this principle has been bent and molded over time, to the
point that these eligibility rules stand in stark contrast to rules
from years ago. 171 While the NCAA attempted to make a case for
following Board of Regents' pro-amateurism language in its first argument, it had to rely on other courts' subsequent application of the
landmark Supreme Court decision because the Supreme Court in
165. Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 23.
166. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note
140, at 24 (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120) (stating that "[tihere can be no question
but that ...

the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education is entirely consistent

with the goals of the Sherman Act.").
167. Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 21-25.
168. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 842.
169.

Marc Edelman, The NCAA's "DeathPenalty" Sanction-Reasonable Self-Governance

or an Illegal GroupBoycott in Disguise?, 18 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 385, 417 (2014) (stating
that "[a]11 [the Board of Regents decision] did was note that the argument could have been
broached by the NCAA as a defense under the Rule of Reason.").

170. Id.; see also Plaintiffs-Appellees' Opposition Brief in Response to NCAA's Opening
Appellate Brief, O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3D 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Brief for
Appellees].
171. See generally Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 3-9.
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Board of Regents did not address the NCAA's rules as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
In particular, the NCAA cited to a number of cases supporting its
view of the Board of Regents holding. 172 To begin, the NCAA argued
that Agnew in particular favors a strong presumption of finding eligibility rules procompetitive on their face because their stated goal
is to preserve the amateur status of the student-athlete. 17 3 Also,
the NCAA used Agnew to argue that bylaws which eliminate the
eligibility of players who receive cash payments beyond the cost of
attendance "clearly protect[ ] amateurism." 174 Next, the NCAA
cited Smith, wherein the Third Circuit highlighted the importance
of amateurism regarding its effect on fair competition.175
Next, the NCAA relied on McCormack, where the Fifth Circuit
held that the NCAA's eligibility rules "enhance public interest in"
college football games and are, thus, procompetitive. 176 The Fifth
Circuit stressed that even though the NCAA had mixed certain professional sports ingredients with amateurism principles into its recipe for student-athletes' intercollegiate athletic success and education, that did not mean the NCAA's eligibility requirements were
unreasonable.17 7 This last sentiment importantly acknowledges the
modern effect that professionalism has had by chipping away bit by
bit at the NCAA's amateurism concept while still maintaining the
vitality of the remaining elements of amateurism aside from those
professional influences. However, the McCormack decision was
rendered 27 years ago, and commercialism within the NCAA has

172. See generally Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 25-31 (citing Agnew v. NCAA,
683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith, 139 F.3d at 180; McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338
(5th Cir. 1988)).
173. Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 26 (stating that if an NCAA rule is supportive
of the "no-payment" and "student-athlete" models, then they are clearly procompetitive); see

also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342-43, n.7 (7th Cir. 2012).
174. Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 25 (citing Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343).
175. Smith, 139 F.3d at 187 (ruling that the NCAA's regulation was procompetitive by
prohibiting post-graduate recruiting so student-athletes would not forgo eligibility at the undergraduate level to preserve athletic eligibility at the post-baccalaureate level); see also
Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 26 ("[T]he bylaw at issue here is a reasonable restraint,
which furthers the NCAA's goal of fair competition and the survival of intercollegiate athletics and is thus procompetitive.").

176.

McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing the di-

viding line between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports and stating that "[tihe
NCAA markets college football as a product distinct from professional football[,]" and that
the NCAA's "eligibility rules create the product and allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 26; Edelman, supra note

129, at 2349.
177. McCormack, 845 F.2d. at 1345 (stating that although "the NCAA has not distilled
amateurism to its purest form does not mean its attempts to maintain a mixture containing
some amateur elements are unreasonable").
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increased so rapidly since then that amateurism is much less central to the NCAA's mission than it was nearly three decades ago.
Similarly, in Banks, the Seventh Circuit held that the "no-draft"
rule and the "no-agent" rule were procompetitive.17 8 The court then
stressed that the two disputed rules helped to maintain separation
between the commercial world of professional sports and the higher
education-based world of intercollegiate athletics. 179 Also, while in
Law the Tenth Circuit held an NCAA regulation that placed a restriction on Division I college coaches' salaries was an unlawful restraint of trade, the court made an important distinction.18 0 In ruling that the NCAA had not proffered a sufficient procompetitive
justification, the court stated that the NCAA could only use its amateurism argument to preserve the amateur status of student-athletes, not the schools' coaches.18 1 Thus, other courts' application of
Board of Regents does seem to support the NCAA's claim that amateurism is, concededly, only a somewhat procompetitive justification of the eligibility rules, especially when looking at the recent
decision rendered by the Seventh Circuit in Agnew. 182
In addressing this first argument of the NCAA, the Ninth Circuit
held that NCAA rules concerning amateurism are not presumptively lawful. 183 More specifically, the court stated that, despite language in Board of Regents, the amateurism rules "are [not] automatically lawful; a restraint that serves a procompetitive purpose
can still be invalid under the Rule of Reason if a substantially less
restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally well." 1 8 4

178.

Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "the NCAA does

not exist as a minor league training ground for future NFL players but rather to provide an
opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate education").

179.

Id. at 1091 (stating that the court "should not permit the entry of professional ath-

letes and their agents into NCAA sports because the cold commercial nature of professional
sports would not only destroy the amateur status of college athletics but more importantly
would interfere with the athletes' proper focus on their educational pursuits and direct their
attention to the quick buck in pro sports").

180.
181.

Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1022, n.14; see also Edelman, supra note 129, at 2339-40 ("Presuming that the

Tenth Circuit's ruling in Law was indeed good law, the same conclusion should logically have
always extended to wage restraints for FBS football players and Division I men's basketball
players, given that both categories 'are closely akin in practice to traditional workers."').

182. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d
180, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1998); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343-44 (5th Cir. 1988);
Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089-90.
183. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2015).
184. Id. at 1064
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The NCAA next argued that the NCAA rules are not covered by
the Sherman Act because they do not regulate "commercial" activity. 185 However, one of the principal cases on which the NCAA relied in its first argument endorses the view that the Sherman Act
applies to nearly all of the NCAA's bylaws. 186
Overall, the court ruled that the challenged NCAA rules clearly
regulate commercial activity, making them subject to the Sherman
Act.187 The Court stated that the "definition [of commerce] surely
encompasses the transaction in which an athletic recruit exchanges
his labor and NIL rights for a scholarship at a Division I school because it is undeniable that both parties to that exchange anticipate
economic gain from it."188
In its third argument, the NCAA maintained that the Plaintiffs
suffered no antitrust injury. 189 In particular, the NCAA made this
argument in regards to the three forms of media that allegedly
harm competition: (1) live-game broadcasts; (2) videogames; and (3)
archival footage. 190 In general, the NCAA argued that student-athletes do not have rights in their NILs with regard to live-game
broadcasts, and that neither the district court nor the Plaintiffs
identified one jurisdiction that recognizes a publicity right in livegame broadcasts. 191 The NCAA itself admitted that when broadcasters and the NCAA negotiate contractually for televised games,
the entities mention NILs; however, the NCAA claimed they do so
merely out of caution, not because broadcasters would start paying
for the NILs if the NCAA permitted it.192 Yet the NCAA cited no
authority for this assertion. 193 Additionally, Plaintiffs' expert, Edwin Desser, who spent 23 years negotiating television contracts as
an NBA senior executive, stated that NIL transfer provisions "are
routine in sports broadcasting arrangements irrespective of any
particularstate statute,"194 implying that these negotiating entities
highly value NIL transfer provisions. Lastly, the Plaintiffs severely
undercut the NCAA's position by pointing out that FBS football and
185. Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 32.
186. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 339-40 (stating "the Sherman Act applies to the NCAA bylaws
generally"); see also McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343-44 (assuming the Sherman Act applied to
the NCAA's promulgation of eligibility rules).
187. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1064-66 (9th Cir. 2015).
188. Id. at 1065.
189. Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 35.
190. Id. at 36-41.
191. Id. at 36-37.
192. Id. at 37-38.
193. Id. at 38.
194. Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 39, 41. Desser also stated that "[NIL] provisions like these are common and . .. have economic value to the television networks. Id.
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Division I men's basketball players sign release forms that require
assignment of NIL rights as a condition of the student-athletes' eligibility. 195
The Ninth Circuit addressed this argument by demonstrating
that the challenged NCAA rules cause the Plaintiffs injury in
fact. 196 In order to satisfy the antitrust-injury requirement, a plaintiff must show "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful." 197 The court then made two points. First, the court
stated that "without the NCAA's compensation rules, video game
makers would negotiate with student-athletes for the right to use
their NILs." 19 8 Specifically, the Court noted that because of the
NCAA's "previous, lengthy relationship" with EA, that it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that it would be possible
for the NCAA and EA to rekindle their relationship to produce college football or college basketball video games. 199
Additionally, the NCAA argued that under the First Amendment,
the Plaintiffs' right of publicity claims were barred under constitutionally protected free speech. 200 However, as Plaintiffs rightly indicated, "[a] ntitrust injury is a modest hurdle, and the First Amendment provides no reason to ignore the substantial harm this anticompetitive restraint inflicts on Plaintiffs." 20 1
Importantly, the NCAA predominantly tracked the district
court's language used in the section of the O'Bannon I opinion addressing potential harm to the group licensing market, and the
three submarkets identified in live-game telecasts, videogames, and
archival footage. 202 However, the district court held that the restraint did not cause harm in the group licensing market but instead caused harm to the college education market. 203 Thus, the
NCAA unwisely attacked a section of the district court's opinion
that actually worked in its favor.
195. See id. at 41.
196. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1066-67.
197. Glen Holly Entm't, Inc. v. Tektronix Inc., 343 F.3d 1000, 1007-08 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

198.
199.
200.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067.
Id. at 1067-68.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 38-39.

201. Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 47 (stating also that "since the Court's summary judgment ruling in April of 2014, there has been no disruption in or chilling effect upon
college sports broadcasting. . . .").

202.
denied
140, at
203.

See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 993-99 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff'd in part,
in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). See generally Brief for Appellant, supra note
35-43.
O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 996-99.
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Second, the court held that "[w]hether the Copyright Act
preempts right-of-publicity claims based on sports video games
[was] tangential to this case and irrelevant to the plaintiffs' standing." 2 0 4 Ultimately, the court concluded that "because the plaintiffs

have shown that, absent the NCAA's compensation rules, video
game makers would likely pay them for the right to use their NILs
in college sports video games, the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement of injury in fact and, by extension, the requirement of
antitrust injury." 205 Thus, the court dismissed three of the NCAA's
main arguments and proceeded to evaluate the district court's analysis under the rule of reason.
Finally, in its last argument, the NCAA maintained that the challenged NCAA rules were valid under a rule of reason analysis.

206

The NCAA claimed that the district court did not identify any significant anticompetitive effects of the restraint and that within the
college education market, student-athletes' opportunities to participate in FBS football and Division I men's basketball are not reduced. 207 Also, the NCAA argued that if NILs are even considered
as part of the unique bundle of goods and services that schools offer
to student-athletes (such as tuition, fees, room and board, books,
certain school supplies, tutoring, coaching, and access to medical
facilities), the challenged rules would have "a de minimis effect in
the relevant market because they would limit only one minor (or
non-existent) component of the bundle, while competition in the
overall relevant market remains robust." 208
The Ninth Circuit rejected the NCAA's arguments, and affirmed
the district court's finding that the NCAA's compensation rules
have a significant anticompetitive effect within the college education market. 209 More specifically, the Court found that the NCAA's
compensation rules have an anticompetitive effect in that "they fix
the price of one component of the exchange between school and recruit, thereby precluding competition among schools with respect to
that component." 210 The court held that this action constituted illegal price-fixing under the Sherman Act, and even if the precise
value of the NIL compensation to the student-athletes cannot be
calculated at this point in the rule of reason analysis, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court that the challenged restraint
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1069.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 43.
Id. at 45 (stating that "competition in the relevant market is [actually] vigorous").
Id. at 47.
O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1071.
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does indeed have anticompetitive effects on the college education
market. 211
Alternatively, the NCAA contended that even if the challenged
restraint produces anticompetitive effects, the district court erred
in rejecting two procompetitive justifications and, consequently,
failed to give enough consideration to the NCAA's amateurism principle as another justification. 2 12 This argument mirrors the NCAA's
first main argument on appeal because it again highlights the amateurism principle as the driving force behind the NCAA's rules. In
particular, the NCAA attempted to counter the district court's assertion that the NCAA's definition of its amateurism principle has
become more "malleable" over time, thereby suggesting that the importance of the amateurism principle as a guiding light is lessening. 2 1 3 Additionally, the NCAA countered that, given how "diverse"
the organization is, the NCAA should not be penalized for making
adaptive changes to its rules. 2 14 Like the NCAA's first main argument, the body of case law does seem to endorse the NCAA's amateurism principle as somewhat procompetitive. Thus, while the
challenged rules do have an anticompetitive effect, fostering amateurism in particular is still recognized as at least a mildly procompetitive effect.
The NCAA then argued that the district court erred by choosing
an illegitimate, less restrictive alternative of structuring the
NCAA's rule prohibiting student-athletes from being paid. 215 The
NCAA claimed that the district court overstepped its boundaries by
departing from the NCAA's "century-old rule that student-athletes
may not be paid to play . ... "216 The NCAA also argued that in
doing so, the district court played the role of a "central planner," "a
role for which [courts] are ill-suited." 2 17 The NCAA further claimed
that the district court's less restrictive alternatives of a stipend fill-

211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1071-72.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 49-50.
Id. at 51.

214. Id. at 54 ("The willingness of an organization with such diverse membership to adjust
its rules over time while at the same time adhering to a set of core principles provides no
basis for condemnation.").

215.

Id. at 54-55.

216. Id. (arguing that now student-athletes can potentially receive $30,000 over the years
for use of their NILs: "$5,000 per year in deferred compensation (via a trust) plus the
difference between full grant-in-aid and cost of attendance (via a stipend), all paid from group
NIL licensing revenue (if there is such a thing")).

217.

Id. at 56 ("In adjusting the NIL price that NCAA members may agree on, the court

thus 'act[ed] as [a] central planner[, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms
of dealing,' 'a role for which [courts] are ill suited."') (citing Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law

Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)).
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ing the gap between grant-in-aid and cost of attendance and a narrowly-tailored deferred trust would "blur the line between amateur
college sports and their professional counterparts," and that "[t]he
court's analysis also improperly fails to defer to the NCAA's judgment about how best to administer college sports." 218
In addition to the NCAA's arguments on appeal, Antitrust Scholars filed an amicus brief supporting the NCAA's last argument. 219
Antitrust Scholars argued mainly that the district court erred in
choosing the less restrictive alternatives because (1) a defendant is
to be given substantial deference in implementing a restraint once
a court finds a valid procompetitive justification; and (2) the district
court's analysis, if accepted, would improperly permit federal courts
to micromanage organizations. 220 In short, Antitrust Scholars argued that the district court "expand[ed] the 'less restrictive
alternative' prong of the antitrust rule of reason well beyond any
appropriate boundaries and would install the judiciary as a
regulatory agency for collegiate athletics." 221 Antitrust Scholars
contended that a less restrictive alternative must be "substantial"
and that it cannot simply be a "tweaking" of the restraint, as that
would give courts the power to control organizations, rather than
interpret laws. 2 2 2 Application of that argument to the district
court's ruling could be interpreted in one of two ways: (1) The district court used a substantially less restrictive alternative in that
"paying" student-athletes any amount departs from the NCAA's
amateurism principle; or (2) Paying student-athletes merely $5,000
a semester for use of their NILs plus a stipend to make up for the

218.

Brief for Appellant, supranote 140, at 57-58 (arguing also that "[e]ven if there were

such doubt [that the NCAA's ban on pay-for-play is reasonably necessary], it should have
been resolved in favor of the NCAA, which is entitled to 'ample latitude' in maintaining am-

ateurism.") (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).
219.

Brief for Antitrust Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, O'Bannon

v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068). Antitrust Scholars
are 15 professors of antitrust law at leading United States universities. Id. at 1. Numerous
other amicus briefs were also filed for this case; however, the brief of the self-titled Antitrust
Scholars was one of the most useful.

220.

Id. at i.

221. Id. at 2. Antitrust Scholars argue that, if accepted, the district court's rule "would
authorize courts to substitute their judgments regarding the details of a restraint for the
judgments made by the actual market participants seeking to achieve admittedly
procompetitive goals." Id. at 3.
222. Id. at 10; see also id. at 13-14 ("[P]reserving amateurism in college sports and
promoting integration of student athletes with their academic communities are at the core of

the NCAA's mission." Further, "because the plaintiff class has failed to identify a
substantially less restrictive alternative to capping payments to players for promoting those
aims, the Court should be able to conclude that the procompetitive benefits outweigh any
alleged competitive harms. . . .").
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cost of attendance and grant in aid is only "tweaking," and, thus,
not valid under antitrust law.
Antitrust Scholars next contended that substituting an antitrust
court's judgment for that of organizations' could open up other entities to similar unfounded judicial tinkering. 223 In essence, Antitrust Scholars used Board of Regents to caution that courts are "illsuited" to "act as central planners, identifying the proper price,
quantity, and other terms of dealing" in place of the judgments of
industry participants. 22 4 Thus, Antitrust Scholars echoed some of
the NCAA's arguments on appeal, in particular those dealing with
the district court's less restrictive alternatives. 22 5
This joint argument from the NCAA and the Antitrust Scholars
was more persuasive than some of the NCAA's other arguments because, on one hand, the NCAA is not accomplishing its goal of furthering amateurism if players are being compensated. On the other
hand, most of this compensation (the $5,000 a year in a deferred
trust) cannot be obtained until a student-athlete loses eligibility, in
which case the NCAA rules would no longer apply. Additionally,
the Plaintiffs posed persuasive arguments to counter the NCAA's
and Antitrust Scholars' contentions. 226 Plaintiffs contended that
the less restrictive alternative of placing NIL payments into a trust
fund to be distributed only after a student-athlete completes eligibility is actually supported by a number of NCAA internal documents, as well as a statement by the NCAA's Executive Vice President for Regulatory Affairs, Oliver Luck, 227 who called the right for
student-athletes to receive compensation for use of their NILs "constitutional" and "fundamental." 22 8
In addressing the argument that the district court should not
have micromanaged the NCAA's approach to administering its amateurism principle, the Plaintiffs countered that "[t]he Sherman Act
sets limits on what violators may and may not do," and that "[t]he
less restrictive alternative analysis under the Rule of Reason necessarily involves an evaluation of the available options a defendant
223.

Id. at 14-15 (arguing that antitrust courts could intervene in Little League baseball

leagues or even kennel clubs).

224.
225.

Id. at 16.
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 140, at 56-58.

226. See generally Brief for Appellees, supra note 170.
227. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 56; see also Michael Marot, NCAA Executive Backs Athlete Image Compensation, AP SPORTS, Dec. 18, 2014, http://collegefootball.ap.org/galaxgazette/article/ncaa-executive-backs-athlete-image-compensation
(quoting
Oliver Luck, who stated, "[s]ome decisions by some institutions have already been made to
provide the full trust fund payments for a student-athlete's names, image and likeness, and
I think we'll see more and more of that").
228. Marot, supra note 227.
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did not utilize." 229 Thus, while the above argument regarding not
micromanaging organizations aided the NCAA more effectively
than some of its other contentions, Plaintiffs' attempts to refute
that argument were greatly bolstered by an internal NCAA communication, an NCAA executive's own opinion of the matter, and the
detailing of the scope of the least restrictive alternative analysis.
B.

Tipping the Scales

While the body of case law and the issue of potentially flawed less
restrictive alternatives presented obstacles for the Plaintiffs, a
number of the Plaintiffs' arguments detailed above, as well as other
collateral authority, worked to defuse the strength of the NCAA's
arguments. The value of the Plaintiffs' additional arguments increase when one realizes what this case was not about. It was not
about "pay-for-play"; rather, the actual legal question here was:
"May the NCAA and its members collude to depress to zero any
compensation for use of Plaintiffs' NILs? 2 3 0
While the relevant case law indicates that over the years courts
have placed at least some value on the NCAA's amateurism concept
and eligibility requirements, 2 3 1 increasing opposition to the NCAA
using certain student-athletes' NILs without compensating them
has changed other courts' attitudes towards the NCAA's rules. For
instance, further buttressing Plaintiffs' argument, the settlement
stemming from In re NIL Litigation can be read to support the notion that entities, like video game companies and the NCAA, may
be manipulating certain student-athletes' rights, at least to some
degree. 232 Given that EA settled with the Plaintiffs and refrained,
at least temporarily, from producing its popular "NCAA College
Football" series, 233 Plaintiffs proved that, unlike pure "amateurs,"
they do have some rights in their NILs-rights that can be negotiated if the NCAA's restraint is modified. Thus, Plaintiffs found support here for the concept that if EA cannot use FBS football players'
NILs in this fashion without some form of revenue being shared
with student-athletes featured in the video games, then the NCAA
229. Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 57.
230. Id. at 24.
231. See generally Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 339 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. NCAA,
139 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1998); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
232. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268
(9th Cir. 2013), cert. dismissed sub nom. Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014); Peter
H. Hamner, EA Settles with College Athletes for $40 Million, NCAA Still in Suit, THOMPSON
REUTERS: THE KNOWLEDGE EFFECT (Oct.

2, 2013),

http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/in-

dex.php/ea-settles-suit-with-college-athletes-for-40-million-ncaa-still-in-suit/.
233. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 831.
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should not be permitted to maintain a system of rules that unreasonably restricts payments to student-athletes for use of their NILs.
Other authorities also bolstered the Plaintiffs' argument by chipping away at the NCAA's amateurism defense, thereby weakening
that procompetitive justification. Most recently, the plaintiffs in
Jenkins v. NCAA 234 have attacked the NCAA's amateurism principle via another antitrust lawsuit. 2 3 5 This lawsuit symbolizes the

underlying movement to give less weight to the NCAA's amateurism principle, thereby allowing student-athletes the chance to share
in some of the revenue generated by their NILs. If a number of
other plaintiffs begin asserting a similar antitrust violation, perhaps courts may attribute less weight to the amateurism principle
and accord more deference to the district court's less restrictive alternatives.
Also, while not an antitrust case, the NLRB decision ruling that
certain FBS football players from Northwestern University were
employees under the FLSA supported the notion that student-athletes should share in some form of compensation generated from
universities' use of their NILs.2 3 6

Importantly, the NLRB found

that Northwestern's football players were not "primarily students,"
and that the football players "worked" more hours per week during
an academic year than "undisputed full-time employees work at
their jobs." 237 While the NLRB did not affirm the ruling on appeal,
it merely declined to exercise jurisdiction and did not truly analyze
the players' arguments. 2 3 8 If the NLRB does so in the future, perhaps it will give the players' arguments more thought in consideration of the changing attitudes towards student-athlete compensation. 2

39

Other realities leant themselves well to supporting the Plaintiffs'
stance that the amateurism concept is now a less important means
of fostering intercollegiate athletics. For instance, while some may
argue that student-athletes are already "paid" via scholarships and
financial aid, these amounts of money pale in comparison to the
funds the NCAA and universities exchange for use of student-athletes' NILs. 2 4 0 Additionally, given that these student-athletes'
234.
235.
236.

Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 4:2014cv02758 (N.D. Cal. filed June 18, 2014).
Id.
Northwestern University & College Athletes Players Ass'n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (2015);

see also supra Section JJ-G, at 25-26 (discussing this issue in-depth).

237.

Id. at 18 (stating that football players spend 40-50 hours on football duties per week

during the three to four-month football season).

238.
239.
240.

See NLRB, supranote 153.
Id.
Wong, supranote 8, at 1094.
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scholarships can be rescinded without cause, an argument that student-athletes are already "paid" this way is similarly weakened. 2 4 1
Even if these schools strip student-athletes of their scholarships,
schools may still use those student-athletes' NILs in television reairings and other media. Refusing to compensate those studentathletes in this situation flies in the face of recognized antitrust
principles, 2 42 especially in light of the fact that, for many studentathletes, intercollegiate athletics might be the only time their NILs
have any value. 2 43 Yet instead, the NCAA (which already makes
billions of dollars from broadcast rights) 2 4 4 still requires these student-athletes to relinquish all rights to those NILs. 2 4 5

Additionally, FBS football and Division I men's basketball
coaches make more and more each year, and TV revenues approach
those of professional sports, while the student athletes receive nothing for licensing of their NILs in spite of the intensely commercialized atmosphere in which they play their respective sports. 2 4 6
While coaches are contractually hired to do a "job," and studentathletes participate on a sports team while in college, acknowledging the great disparity between coaches and the NCAA on one hand
and student-athletes on the other suggests that, whether the NCAA
admits it or not, commercialization has crept further than ever into
the NCAA's recipe for amateurism, setting the scene for a major
shift in the world of intercollegiate athletics.
In consideration of the above arguments, the Ninth Circuit
moved to the second step of the Rule of Reason, namely, determining whether the NCAA posited any procompetitive justifications for
its compensation rules. 2 4 7 In performing this analysis, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the "compensation rules do not promote
competitive balance, that they do not increase output in the college
education market, and that they play a limited role in integrating
241. Josh Levin, The Most Evil Thing about College Sports, SLATE MAGAZINE (May 17,
2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports-nut/2012/05/ncaa scholarship rules-it
smorally indefensible that athletic scholarships-can be-yanked after one year for any reason html.
242. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). As mentioned as a central
thread throughout this article, refusing to allow schools the chance to compensate these student-athletes essentially constitutes an illegal price-fixing agreement that sets the value of
the student-athletes' NILs at zero. This activity constitutes an unreasonable restraint on
trade, justifying the Plaintiffs' proffered (and district court-approved) less restrictive alternatives.
243. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 853.
244. Wong, supranote 8, at 1070, 1086.
245. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 850.
246. See id. at 855.
247. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Grimmett, supra
note 9, at 833 (explaining the rule of reason analysis).
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student-athletes with their schools' academic communities, since
the [Ninth Circuit had] been offered no meaningful argument that
those findings were clearly erroneous." 248 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
focused mainly on the NCAA's amateurism defense.
In considering these points, the Ninth Circuit did indeed critically analyze the Board of Regents Court's and its progeny's interpretation of the amateurism principle. The Ninth Circuit stated
that it "fail[ed] to see how the restraint at issue in this particular
case-i.e., the NCAA's limits on student-athlete compensationmakes college sports more attractive to recruits, or widens recruits'
spectrum of choices in the sense that Board of Regents suggested." 2 4 9

The Supreme Court in Board of Regents merely dis-

cussed the amateurism principle in dicta in identifying it as a procompetitive benefit. 2 50 Also, while the Supreme Court wrote that
the importance of amateurism is central to the mission of the
NCAA, 2 5 1 and a number of courts following Board of Regents have
mentioned amateurism as important to the NCAA, 2 5 2 the increased
amount of commercial activity within FBS and Division I men's basketball in recent years has severely blurred the lines between the
amateurism concept and professionalism. 253 This blurring makes it
extremely difficult to consistently cite amateurism as a highly regarded procompetitive benefit of the NCAA's challenged rules. 2 5 4

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that "as Board of Regents
demonstrates, not every rule adopted by the NCAA that restricts
the market is necessary to preserving the 'character' of college
sports ."255

In addition, other collateral authority suggests that the amateurism principle is not the procompetitive benefit it once was. For one,
the settlement reached in In re NIL Litigation 256 implies that if a
prominent video game developer cannot use college football players'
NILs in video games without compensation, the NCAA should also
be prohibited from barring any compensation to its student-athletes
248.
249.
250.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.
Id. at 1072-73.
See Edelman, supra note 129, at 2340-41 (stating that Board of Regents does not

stand for the proposition that "certain NCAA restraints are per se legal").

251. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
252. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342-43 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d
180, 186 (3d Cir. 1998); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988).
253. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 12-17; Carrier, supra note 117, at 1; Edelman, supra note 129, at 2333; Grimmett, supra note 9, at 842; Wong, supra note 8, at 1094.

254.

See Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 12-17; Carrier, supra note 117, at 1; Edel-

man, supra note 129, at 2333; Grimmett, supra note 9, at 842; Wong, supra note 8, at 1094.

255.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074.
256. 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. dismissed sub nom. Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135
S. Ct. 42 (2014).
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for widespread use of their NILs in various forms. Additionally, the
current Jenkins lawsuit may be the result of O'Bannon's ripple effect, where another group of Plaintiffs have sued the NCAA to fight
for student-athletes' rights in their NILs. 2 5 7 Viewing this case in
conjunction with a vastly increased commercial atmosphere, amateurism is no longer as central to the NCAA's mission as in the past.
Another case to be considered is the recent NLRB decision, before
the NLRB reversed the decision on appeal, which declared certain
Northwestern football players to be employees. 258 Recognizing that
certain student-athletes are "employees," rather than strictly amateurs, is more akin to these players being considered professionals
who are paid to do a job.
The Ninth Circuit seemed to agree that amateurism does have a
limited procompetitive benefit; however, "it is primarily 'the opportunity to earn a higher education' that attracts athletes to college
sports rather than professional sports . . . and that opportunity

would still be available to student-athletes if they were paid some
compensation in addition to their athletic scholarships." 2 59 Further,
the Ninth Circuit itself admitted that "if anything, loosening or
abandoning the compensation rules might be the best way to 'widen'
recruits' range of choices; athletes might well be more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that they were
earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school." 2 60
The Ninth Circuit even acknowledged that making the compensation rules less strict might be one of the most efficient ways of
broadening student-athletes' choice. In concluding its analysis of
the NCAA's amateurism principle, the Ninth Circuit agreed that
the "NCAA cannot fully answer the district court's finding that the
compensation rules have significant anticompetitive effects simply
by pointing out that it has adhered to those rules for a long time." 2 6 1
Even so, the Ninth Circuit found, like the district court, that the
NCAA's compensation rules do serve two limited procompetitive
benefits: "integrating academics with athletics, and preserving the
popularity of the NCAA's product by promoting its current understanding of amateurism." 2 62 Thus, the only remaining question for

257. See Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 4:2014cv02758 (N.D. Cal. filed June 18, 2014).
258. See Northwestern University & College Athletes Players Ass'n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167, at
19 (2015).
259. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073 (quoting O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 986
(N.D. Cal. 2014)).
260. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073 (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262.

Id. (internal quotation removed).
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the Ninth Circuit was the validity of the district court's two less
restrictive alternatives.
C.

The Turning Point

In assessing the landscape of O'Bannon at this juncture, one
point became abundantly clear: given that amateurism was deemed
only somewhat procompetitive by the Ninth Circuit, whether the
district court overstepped its boundaries in formulating the less restrictive alternatives would determine the outcome of the case. By
using thousands of NCAA FBS football and Division I men's basketball players' NILs in various forms of media, the NCAA has generated a massive following and, thus, indisputably makes billions
of dollars via its student-athletes. 2 6 3 Therefore, because the restraint governs commercial activity, the Plaintiffs correctly chose
an antitrust lawsuit as the avenue to achieve more equitable rights
for student-athletes, and the O'Bannon district court correctly held
that the NCAA unreasonably restrained trade by fixing the price of
their NILs at zero and disallowing athletes from receiving at least
some of the revenue gained from the use of their NILs.2 6 4
In moving to the third step of the rule of reason analysis, the
Ninth Circuit, however, partially disagreed with the district court
in allowing athletes to receive no more than $5,000 of deferred compensation a year until they leave school. 265 "[T]o be viable under
the Rule of Reason-an alternative must be 'virtually as effective'
in serving the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA's current rules,
2 66
and 'without significantly increased cost."'

First, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the less restrictive alternative
of capping the permissible amount of scholarships at the cost of attendance. 267 The Ninth Circuit noted that the NCAA's President,
Dr. Mark Emmert, testified at trial that this less restrictive alternative would not violate the amateurism principle as that money
would cover student-athletes' legitimate costs to attend school, and
no evidence suggested that consumers would lose interest in college
sports if scholarships covered the cost of attendance. 2 68 He also tes-

263. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 170, at 35; Wong, supra note 8, at 1070.
264. See O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007.
265. See O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1052-53.
266. Id.at 1074 (citing Cnty. of Tuolumne u. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
267. See id. at 1074-76.
268. Id. at 1075.
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tified that an increase in the grant-in-aid cap would not impede student-athletes' integration into their academic communities. 2 69 Further, "evidence at trial showed that the grant-in-aid cap has no relation whatsoever to the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA: by
the NCAA's own standards, student-athletes remain amateurs as
long as any money paid to them goes to cover legitimate educational
expenses." 270 With regard to the first less restrictive alternative,
the Ninth Circuit stated that if "a restraint is patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary to accomplish all of its procompetitive objectives, an antitrust court can and should invalidate it and
order it replaced with a less restrictive alternative." 2 7 1 As such, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the less restrictive alternative of an injunction capping the permissible amount of scholarships at the cost of
attendance. 272

Second, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the district court's second less
restrictive alternative, i.e., allowing student-athletes to receive deferred cash compensation for the NCAA's and schools' use of their
NILs. 2 7 3 The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he question is whether
the alternative of allowing students to be paid NIL compensation
unrelated to their education expenses, is 'virtually as effective' in
preserving amateurism as not allowing compensation." 2 7 4 Here, the
Ninth Circuit diverged sharply from the district court's analysis.
The court stated that "in finding that paying students cash compensation would promote amateurism as effectively as not paying
them, the district court ignored that not paying student-athletes
is precisely what makes them amateurs."275
The Ninth Circuit continued by discussing the difference between
offering student-athletes compensation vs. no compensation, and
offering them small amounts of compensation vs. large amounts of
compensation. For instance, the court stated that "there is a stark
difference between finding that small payments are less harmful to
the market than large payments-and finding that paying students

269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at n.18 (stating that whilethe NCAA now permits schools and
conferences to choose to raise their scholarship caps to the full cost of attendance, it could
still change its mind about that issue at any time. Further, "[t]he district court's injunction
prohibiting the NCAA from setting a cap any lower than the cost of attendance thus remains
in effect, which means that the NCAA's challenge to that portion of the injunction is not
moot.")
273. Id. at 1074, 1076.
274. Id. at 1076 (citing Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148,
1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).
275. Id.
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small sums is virtually as effective in promoting amateurism as not
paying them." 2 7 6 Further, the court elaborated by stating, "The difference between offering student- athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap." 2 77
The Ninth Circuit then addressed various district court witnesses' opinions of NIL compensation to student-athletes. The
NCAA's own expert witness Neal Pilson, a television sports consultant formerly employed at CBS, testified, "I tell you that a million
dollars would trouble me and $5,000 wouldn't, but that's a pretty
good range." 2 78 When Pilson was asked whether deferred compensation to students would concern him, "Pilson said that while he
would not be as concerned by deferred payments, he would still be
'troubled by it."'279 The court then surmised that "Pilson's offhand
comment under cross-examination [was] the sole support for the
district court's $5,000 figure" and that this comment "[was] simply
not enough to support the district court's far-reaching conclusion
that paying students $5,000 per year will be as effective in preserving amateurism as the NCAA's current policy." 2 8 0
However, the Ninth Circuit failed to properly acknowledge how,
as discussed above, the NCAA's amateurism principle has been
whittled away by increasing commercial forces within the industry.
Thus, the term "amateur," in and of itself, means something vastly
different than it did 32 years ago in Board of Regents.281 Further, if
the Ninth Circuit had placed less procompetitive value on the
NCAA's amateurism principle than the district court, the Ninth
Circuit would, and should, have found that depositing deferred NIL
compensation into a trust for student-athletes to use after leaving
school, is not a "quantum leap." 2 82 Rather, it is a calculated, logical
maneuver made in order to enable these student-athletes to receive
just compensation that they would not touch until they left their
respective sports teams, thereby not technically affecting their status as "amateurs" while in school.

276. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077.
277. Id. at 1078.
278. Id. at 1078.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 128 (1984); O'Bannon, 802
F.3d at 1076-77 (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102) (stating that "the market for college
football is distinct from other sports markets and must be 'differentiate [d]' from professional
sports lest it become minor league [football]").

282.

Id.
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In his dissent, Chief Judge Sidney Runyan Thomas correctly
stated that the majority mischaracterized the question to be answered with regard to the less restrictive alternatives. He stated:
"[R]ather, we must determine whether allowing student-athletes to
be compensated for their NILs is 'virtually as effective' in preserving popular demand for college sports [not preserving amateurism,] 2 8 3 as not allowing compensation." 284 Additionally, the dissent
rightly explained that "[i]n terms of antitrust analysis, the concept
of amateurism is relevant only insofar as it relates to consumer interest." 2 8 5 To restate the rule again, "to be viable under the Rule of
Reason-an alternative must be 'virtually as effective' in serving
the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA's current rules, and 'without significantly increased cost."' 2 8 6 Thus, the alternative must
serve the procompetitive benefit's-amateurism's-procompetitive
purposes, i.e., preserving popular demand for college sports.
Viewed through this lens, the Ninth Circuit would have properly
analyzed the issue.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Pilson's testimony, as
well as its incorrect perception of the district court's formulation of
the $5,000 deferred compensation figure, each represent erroneous
conclusions. The dissent rightly pointed out that a number of the
NCAA's expert witnesses indicated that "smaller payments to student-athletes would bother them less than larger payments." 287 Additionally, in preparation for trial, NCAA expert witness Dr. J. Michael Dennis conducted a survey of consumer attitudes concerning
college sports in 2013, a survey which revealed that "the public's
attitudes toward student-athlete compensation depend heavily on
the level of compensation that student-athletes would receive." 288
As such, this evidence was certainly enough to prove that $5,000 of
deferred NIL compensation would be "virtually as effective" at preserving "consumer demand for college sports." 289 Again, this statement supplies the proper issue to be determined. Being virtually
as effective at preserving amateurism would be extremely difficult
to do given that "'amateurism' has proven a nebulous concept prone

283. See id. at 1076.
284. Id. at 1080 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1081.
286. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074 (citing Cnty. of Tholumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236
F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).
287. Id. at 1082 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 955, 1001
(N.D. Cal. 2014)) (stating that Stanford Athletic Director, Bernard Muir, and Mr. Pilson
would not be bothered by smaller amounts of compensation to student-athletes).

288.
289.

Id. (quoting O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. at 1000-01).
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1081 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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to an ever-changing definition." 290 The dissent makes one final lasting point, the substance of which this Article echoes throughout:
Division I schools have spent $5 billion on athletic facilities
over the past 15 years. The NCAA sold the television rights to
broadcast the NCAA men's basketball championship tournament for 12 years to CBS for $10.8 billion dollars. The NCAA
insists that this multi-billion dollar industry would be lost if
the teenagers and young adults who play for these college
teams earn one dollar above their cost of school attendance. 29 1
Thus, the dissent properly evaluated the district court's less restrictive alternatives and rightly pointed out (1) that the majority
viewed the district court's less restrictive alternatives through the
wrong lens; (2) that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
justify the district court's selection of the $5,000 deferred NIL compensation as a less restrictive alternative; and (3) that given how
dramatically and dynamically the concept of "amateurism" has
changed over time, the NCAA should not have been afforded as
much deference, and consequently, the district court's selection of
less restrictive alternatives was entirely sound.
Instead of vacating the district court's second less restrictive alternative, the Ninth Circuit should have properly employed the following framework when conducting the rule of reason analysis: 292
(1) As the Plaintiffs properly alleged anticompetitive effects of the
NCAA's rules on the college education market, the Ninth Circuit
should have weighed the NCAA's proffered procompetitive effects
of the challenged restraint-in particular, the amateurism principle; (2) the Ninth Circuit should then have given less weight to the
amateurism principle, a mildly procompetitive benefit that would,
accordingly, have been less influential to the analysis because a
$5,000 ceiling is virtually as effective at preserving amateurism's
procompetitive effects; and (3) if the procompetitive effects were
rightly afforded less weight (as the district court concluded they
should have been), then the Plaintiffs' less restrictive alternatives
would have been strengthened by default, thereby tipping the
scales in the Plaintiffs' favor on appeal.
If future courts tackle this issue and permit schools to share at
least some compensation with their student-athletes, those courts

290. Id. at 1083.
291. Id. (emphasis added).
292. See generally Tanaka u. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Hairston u. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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must still be cautious not to raise that cap excessively. In that situation, courts would enable these student-athletes to potentially
reap a windfall from NIL licensing in conjunction with their scholarships and grant-in-aid, thereby truly transforming the NCAA into
more of a professional organization akin to the National Football
League ("NFL") or National Basketball Association ("NBA"). While
the NCAA is indeed much closer to resembling these professional
organizations than it has been in the past, allowing student-athletes to be paid as true professionals completely obliterates, rather
than strongly deemphasizes, the NCAA's amateurism principlean outcome that current, and near future, courts should be very
wary of permitting.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit, NCAA, and other authorities made
some worthwhile arguments regarding the importance of amateurism and the O'Bannon district court's allegedly flawed selection of
less restrictive alternatives. However, given the district court's
careful consideration of the NCAA's procompetitive justifications,
the magnitude and breadth of the modern-day NCAA, and the
changing attitudes towards student-athletes being "paid," the
Ninth Circuit erred in vacating the district court's less restrictive
alternative of requiring the NCAA to allow its member schools to
pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation. Because commercialism has invaded the NCAA's once defensible citadel of "amateurism," and also because the compensation
given to these student-athletes would not be mandatory but rather
permissible by NCAA member schools, the Ninth Circuit should
have determined that both of the district court's less restrictive alternatives were valid under the rule of reason. the While the
O'Bannon Plaintiffs petitioned the United States Supreme Court to
review the case, 293 the Court denied certiorari, 294 thereby denying
the district court's second less restrictive alternative. However, current and future student-athlete plaintiffs should not relent and
should follow in the O'Bannon Plaintiffs footsteps in an attempt to
acquire a ruling that will rewrite how college athletes are treated
within the NCAA, an empire many once thought invincible.

293. See Jon Solomon, Ed O'Bannon plaintiffs ask Supreme Court to take NCAA case,
CBSSPORTS COM. (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ed-obannon-plaintiffs-ask-supreme-court-to-take-ncaa-case/.
294. See Steve Berkowitz and A. Perez, Supreme Court will not consider the Ed
O'Bannon antitrustcase againstthe NCAA, USATODAY.COM (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2016/10/03/supreme-court-ed-obannon-ncaa-

antitrust-case/91462090/.
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CONCLUSION

The atmosphere of intercollegiate athletics has changed dramatically since the Board of Regents decision. Undoubtedly, the worlds
of FBS football and Division I men's basketball are encircled by the
forces of commercialism more than ever before, with players' NILs
appearing during games on televisions, computers, tablets, social
media, and even cell phone applications. 2 9 5 Student-athletes play
competitive collegiate sports in a world where the NCAA's concept
of amateurism intertwines itself inextricably with a hugely commercialized industry that uses players' NILs to generate and maintain massive fan bases year after year, while the players themselves
receive no revenue from the NCAA's use of their NILs. 2 9 6
The O'Bannon Plaintiffs rightly turned to an antitrust lawsuit to
wage war on the NCAA's unreasonably restrictive rules system.
While the NCAA's amateurism concept is still mildly important to
the success of its product, the importance of this principle is nowhere near the guiding light it used to be decades ago. As such, the
Ninth Circuit should have given less weight to the NCAA's amateurism principle as a procompetitive benefit and, in turn, given
more weight to the district court's approved less restrictive alternatives. The district court properly found less restrictive alternatives
in the $5,000 a year of deferred compensation via a trust, plus the
difference in full grant-in-aid and cost of attendance via a stipend.
While, admittedly, the decision to allow or disallow student-athletes to receive NIL compensation is a close one, the Ninth Circuit
erred by reversing the district court's less restrictive alternative of
allowing student-athletes to receive deferred NIL compensation.
And while the Supreme Court denied certiorari, future student-athletes should not throw in the towel. Rather, they should draw up a
"Hail Mary" pass and keep fighting in the court system, where, if
they are successful, they could alter the landscape for intercollegiate athletes' rights for years to come.

295.

See generally ESPN, NCAAF, ESPN.GO.COM, http://m.espn.go.com/ncf/ (last visited

Jan. 3, 2016).

While this is a website where consumers can stream various sports games,

including NCAA FBS and Division I men's basketball, it is also available as a mobile application for cell phones. Id. See also ESPN (@ESPN), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2015, 11:22 P.M.),
https://twitter.com/espn/status/682778999425265665. The video clip embedded in this tweet
depicts the Alabama Crimson Tide's Derrick Henry running for a touchdown during the 2015
Cotton Bowl game against the Michigan State Spartans. Id. The game was broadcast on

ESPN, and this clip was posted directly to Twitter. Id.
296. Grimmett, supra note 9, at 859-60.

